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Similarly, the fabric of modern society as a whole is woven from the conductive fibers of electric grids. Critical components of infrastructure depend on the availability of electricity.
Widespread and sustained power outages would have devastating second-order economic and social implications ranging from failure of essential public sanitation systems to loss of refrigeration for food and medical stockpiles. The inability to rapidly recover from a largescale blackout could promote regional instability, depending on the robustness of energy delivery infrastructures.
An electro-magnetic attack is one mechanism in which a state or non-state actor might exercise "directed-energy warfare." Delivered through a host of possible weapons systems, the range of impacts to friendly systems is vast; from a high-precision laser device capable of rendering individual weapons systems useless, to a nuclear detonation wiping out electronic systems over an entire region.
But, perhaps surprisingly, the greatest threat to this critical vulnerability may not be posed by a belligerent adversary at all. Rather, it could arrive in a stream of high-energy particles bombarding the Earth's magnetic field, the result of a massive explosion on the surface of the Sun. Space weather is the collective term used to describe the various manifestations of this phenomenon. While minor events have caused numerous operational impacts over the past 20 years, an event of theoretical maximum proportions has not occurred since the evolution of the "wired planet." 1 A century and a half ago, however, such a storm did hit the planet. Known more commonly as "the Carrington event," this episode serves as an ominous warning of disruptive capacity of the space environment. A recurrence of a similar event would trigger geomagnetically induced currents capable of destroying electrical components both on orbit and on the ground. Without an adequate mitigation strategy, nearly every aspect of modern operational warfare will be impacted. Commanders at every echelon must develop and exercise a plan to manage the first-and second-order effects of a worst-case space weather event on the modern operational environment or risk losing command and control capability and jeopardizing theater security. Figure 1 ) to be a landmark in space weather, likely the most severe event in recorded history. 5 While spectacular to observers on the ground, the negative impacts were rather subtle. For a brief period, sailors likely reverted to celestial navigation in lieu of the compass. Telegraph traffic was hampered for a few days while damaged components of the system were repaired. Otherwise, modern society, as it was in the day, was completely intact. After all, power grids, satellites, radios, and microprocessors had yet to appear on the world stage in 1859.
BACKGROUND

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS
Appreciation of the space weather threat must start during the operational planning to be intuitive. However, as our dependence on interconnected high-tech systems grows, it is imperative that joint forces understand what is at stake in other physical domains when chaos reigns above the atmosphere.
Operators understand weather; space weather is another story
The general lack of understanding of space weather is pervasive throughout the The collective appreciation for the space environment is growing among senior leaders. 
Environmental Apples and Oranges
Simple orbital geometry drives annual periodic temperature fluctuations on Earth, which in turn drive fairly predictable seasons. We know, for instance, that the best chance for sweltering heat is in the summer, and we exploited this knowledge to prosecute the combat phases of both Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM. By attacking during the relatively cooler spring, the Coalition maximized combat efficiency by reducing the impacts of high temperature on systems and forces. Thus, in these cases, weather played a large role in balancing the operational factors of force and time. Space weather should be a coequal player during the operational planning process.
Like the Earth, the Sun is a dynamic entity. The solar cycle, however, is not measured in terms of temperature. Rather, the magnetic structure of the star drives solar seasons.
Whereas the peak in annual temperature generally occurs every twelve months on Earth, the peak in solar magnetic activity occurs only once every eleven years. The following graph shows the solar activity since the mid-eighteenth century. The data shown here are indicative of a relatively predictable periodic peak in the number of sun spots, 9 a condition commonly referred to as "solar max." 9. Sun spots are described by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as being "dark, often roughly circular features on the solar surface" forming "where denser bundles of magnetic field lines from the solar interior break through the surface." Because intense magnetic anomalies on the Sun's surface contort solar matter, the relatively cooler regions often appear darker than the surrounding matter. were interrupted for several hours by anomalies in the ionosphere. 13 The life and death implications of losing this capability are obvious.
Planners must consider the heightened probability of severe space weather when executing an operation during solar max. Figure 2 represents the same data as Figure 1 , with two modifications: The scope of the analysis is narrowed to the last three decades and few of the strongest solar flares (orange triangles) as measured by the magnitudes of their X-ray Narrowing the analysis to the first half of 1991and including the remaining Top-20 Xray flares in Figure 3 , it's easy to see that the ground campaign was conducted during a lull in severe space weather. June, it is reasonable to conclude that there would undoubtedly have been more widespread and possibly catastrophic communications losses throughout the theater of operations.
Clearly, the JIPOE process must consider that space-dependent technology is most susceptible to space weather during solar max. This is also when the greatest threat to ground components and electrical infrastructure are most likely to occur. While solar max is no guarantee of operation-limiting impacts, it is a strong indicator of increased risk.
What Another Carrington Event Would Mean Today
In May 2008, the National Academy of Science (NAS) convened a committee of space weather and infrastructure experts to examine the potential societal impacts of a space weather event on the order of the Carrington flare. The motivation for the workshop was partly rooted in another substantial space weather event which occurred during the last solar max, in October and November 2003. Dubbed the "Halloween Space Weather Storms," they produced 17 significant solar flares, including the strongest X-ray flare recorded in the last 30 years (see the orange triangle of X-ray magnitude 28 in Figure 2 necessarily be rerouted to avoid communications blackouts and to prevent excessive radiation exposure.
The direct tie of these effects to military operations is clear. In a worst-case space weather scenario, communications throughout the area of operations would be tenuous at best. Whatever reliance we have on commercial power sources will have to be backed-up by locally generated power. Our space-based intelligence collection and battlefield characterization capabilities would be severely degraded. In short, some of the most basic technological advances of the past century, those which have given us the edge in combat operations in recent years, could unravel within as little as 18 hours notice, the time it takes the high energy particles to cover the distance between the Sun and the Earth.
What are not immediately obvious, though, are the long-term second-order effects of a Carrington-class flare. The U.S. Government describes the situation in the following way:
"The space environment around Earth is becoming of ever-increasing importance for the successful operation of commercial, government, and national security infrastructure essential to the Nation." 30 The 2008 NAS workshop concluded that the economic blow to the U.S. economy would be $1 trillion to $2 trillion during the first year alone. It is also estimated that complete recovery of infrastructure would take anywhere from four to ten The recently published Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 highlights the potential of cascading socio-political effects owing to the collapse of infrastructure. 32 Particularly in weak states, the loss of power production capability is a direct threat to theater stability. In fact, one of the major measures of success for the coalition in Iraq today is the effectiveness of community power grids. A recent Multi-National Corps press release stated, "Next to clean drinking water, the people of Samarra mark access to electricity as their most important concern." 33 It is important for operational commanders to realize that whatever progress has been made on the ground in terms of infrastructure improvement is vulnerable to severe space weather events. However, planners must strike a delicate balance between building capacity and survivability on an acceptable timeline.
It is true that communities such as Samarra, where hundreds of meters of power lines have been strung and efforts to connect local grids to substations are of the highest priority, lack the infrastructure robustness to withstand a severe geomagnetic storm. However it can be argued that space weather is merely a peripheral issue. While a Carrington-class flare would pose some threat to theater security, the necessity of providing a basic capability to the population far outweighs any requirement to safeguard it from such a low-probability event.
In reality, the 1859 solar flares satisfied every criterion for a major solar storm. It was the "perfect solar storm," and one of similar magnitude has not happened since, nor is it For example, we could not have planned Operation DESERT STORM around the solar cycle. The strategic situation at the time did not allow for it. In fact, close examination of Figure 3 shows a Top-20 flare did occur in the middle of the air campaign. Yet the operational objectives were achieved in spite of the space environmental situation. There is an argument to be made that, as long as space weather is considered in the JIPOE process, operational commanders must simply accept the increased risk to vulnerable systems and plan to operate in a degraded state.
However, that the cost of not preparing for this high-impact, low-frequency event is much higher. The fact of the matter is, the Carrington event happened. Despite the low probability in the short term, an eventual reoccurrence is only a matter of time. As the events of the last two solar cycles have shown, even relatively mild geomagnetic storms jeopardize military operations and cost societies billions of dollars. If operational planners and commanders prepare for the worst-case scenario, they will naturally mitigate the impacts from less extreme events. identified an attack on the U.S. electrical grid by a hostile actor as a major threat to regional security:
"It is impractical to protect the entire electrical power system from damage by an EMP attack. There are too many components of too many different types, manufacturers, designs, and vulnerabilities within too many jurisdictional entities, and the cost to retrofit is too great. Widespread functional collapse of the electrical power system in the area affected by EMP is possible in the face of a geographically broad EMP attack… The United States must not permit an EMP attack to defeat its capability to prevail. The Commission believes it is not practical to protect all of the tactical forces of the US and its coalition partners from EMP in a regional conflict. A strategy of replacement and reinforcement will be necessary. However, there is a set of critical capabilities that is essential to tactical regional conflicts that must be available to these reinforcements. This set includes satellite navigation systems, satellite and airborne intelligence and targeting systems, an adequate communications infrastructure, and missile defense. The current capability to field a tactical force for regional conflict is inadequate in light of this requirement." 35
At first glance, it would appear the EMP and space weather threats are unrelated. On the contrary, the alarming description of our inability to counter a threat to technology is even more poignant when one examines how the Commission quantified the potential effects of a "geographically broad EMP attack." They describe the currents induced by the most effective EMPs as being "comparable to those expected to arise in the largest geomagnetic storm ever observed." This analysis supports the hypothesis that a repeat of the historical Carrington event would have devastating effects on the joint operational environment, both in terms of military capabilities and theater security. It also highlights the fact that global impacts from cataclysmic space weather could potentially be on par with many of the electromagnetic effects of a global thermonuclear attack.
The lack of preparedness has not gone unnoticed. In an 18 Nov 2009 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Representative Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-MD) relayed his concern 35. Ibid, 48.
about the reoccurrence of a Carrington event. In discussions with "a high official" in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Rep. Bartlett was told that "our grid would come down" and that it would be years before it could be restored. The official relayed to the Congressman that "probably 80 percent of the population would die." 36 Rep. Bartlett went on to express his dismay at the lack of action on the part of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. When pressed for an explanation, David Berteau (Director, Defense Industrial Initiatives Group, Center For Strategic and International Studies) acknowledged his concern but steered clear of the FERC prediction. He did, however, point out another critical vulnerability: "Fifteen years ago, much of the defense infrastructure in the U.S. had its own independent power sources. Today that's no longer true. We've now privatized, and DoD is largely dependent on the commercial grid."
What's the likelihood of Carrington II? order effects of a severe geomagnetic storm might lead to regional and, perhaps, theater-wide instability. On a smaller scale, this point is driven home almost daily throughout Southwest Asia, as evidenced in the aforementioned Samarra case.
Thirdly, as another period of increasing solar activity approaches at the same time dependence on technology is growing, operational-level decision-makers are becoming increasingly vulnerable to space environmental effects. In some sense, we are even more atrisk of mission failure today than we were in 1859 during the infancy of global telecommunications.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Regardless of the state of readiness of the U.S. Government, and with the active solar phase predicted to begin in the next two to three years, 41 it's critical for commanders to prepare now to be able to operate in a technologically-degraded operational environment.
Despite the somewhat dire portrait of military readiness presented above, there are many ways in which commanders can minimize susceptibility to severe space weather. Operators would do well to note the ultimate mission success of the USMC crew discussed previously.
Because they had been trained in map navigation and had current maps on-hand, and because they had trained to operate during communications blackouts, the space weather impacts to their mission were mitigated. Commanders at all levels must similarly insist on bolstering high-tech training with "old-school" backup tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Additionally, total communications outages must be exercised routinely, both at the operational and the tactical levels. Scenarios should play themselves out, so that the cascading effects of widespread power failures are realistically captured and courses of action can be developed to deal with the security implications of infrastructure collapse.
Ibid.
Finally, joint doctrine, theater security plans and formal training must fully incorporate lessons learned from previous real-world space weather events as well as those gleaned from exercises. Only through institutionalizing the threats posed by a hostile space environment can progress be made toward insulation from its effects. At the very least, when executed, the JIPOE process must include the prescribed thorough analysis of the space environment in order to mitigate impacts to friendly operations and to identify vulnerabilities to space weather in enemy courses of action.
These measures will significantly increase the viability of combat power in a degraded operational environment. As technology continues to drive the evolution of modern operational warfare, recognition of its inherent vulnerabilities to space weather is essential.
Only through due diligence and deliberate planning can we mitigate the potentially catastrophic impacts to communications and theater security. The bottom line is this: the Sun is a completely indiscriminant actor. All other things being equal on the battlefield, the ability of one belligerent to overcome the other may just lie in his ability to better minimize and exploit the adverse effects of severe space weather.
APPENDIX A General Description of Space Weather Impacts
Solar particles interacting with Earth's magnetic field may result in a geomagnetic storm. The effects can rapidly overwhelm electrical circuitry and induce currents in existing power grids and pipelines. Excessive geomagnetically-induced currents can produce dangerously high currents in long transmission lines and damage vulnerable power transformers and electrical transfer nodes. Under the right circumstances, isolated faults can cascade to cause systematic failure of regional energy infrastructures.
Spacecraft are particularly vulnerable to geomagnetic storms. One way in which satellites might succumb to space weather occurs when sensitive components exposed to the ambient environment accumulate electrical charge from the transiting particles. If sufficient electric potential develops between spacecraft components, devastating arcing can literally fry the multi-million dollar assets.
Geomagnetic storms are also capable of changing the flight path of a satellite.
Increasing the number of energetic particles causes the upper atmosphere to expand, leading to increased density at altitude and drag on a spacecraft in low-earth orbit. Unless corrected, the resultant loss in altitude ultimately shortens the lifespan of the asset and makes it more difficult for operators on the ground to locate and use the spacecraft for its intended purpose.
The fluctuations in ionospheric (the ionosphere can be considered the top of the atmosphere for the purposes of this paper) density caused by geomagnetic storms can also result in severe propagation errors. Take for example, looking toward the horizon down the length of a hot blacktop road. The mirage you see (product) is the result of the distortion of light (signal) passing through differing densities of air in the lowest layer of the atmosphere prior to arriving at your eye (sensor). Geomagnetic storms likewise distort signals traveling through the ionosphere. Positions derived from Global Positioning System signals are occasionally so erroneous that they become unusable. Precision-guided munitions, satellite navigation, satellite telephones, and precision timing can be significantly degraded during geomagnetic storms. Additionally, high frequency communications equipment which relies on the ionosphere for long-distance transmission may be unusable.
Secondly, increased levels of radioactivity both in space and in the upper atmosphere result in solar radiation storms. During severe events astronauts may be exposed to lethal doses of radiation. Aircrews and passengers flying at high latitudes may also experience lifethreatening exposure, depending on the flight level. During a space weather event in 2003, NASA directed astronauts to take shelter. Commercial airlines rerouted all flight plans north of 57 degrees latitude in order to avoid hazardous radiation levels, estimated to be the equivalent of 100 chest X-rays. 42 Excessive solar radiation also causes permanent damage to spacecraft solar panels, the only means of powering some satellites.
Lastly, high-levels of X-ray radiation associated with space weather may lead to radio blackouts. During these periods, High Frequency (HF) communications and low-frequency navigation aids may be degraded or unavailable for hours at a time on the entire sunlit side of the 
